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In the SupreDie Court 
of the State of Utah 
ILLINOIS POWDER MANUF AC-




STATE TAX CO:MMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH and R. 
E. HAMMOND, J. WELTON 
vV ARD and ELISHA WARNER, 





G. HAL TAYLOR 
Attorney for Defendant 
~·· . 
BRIEF OF DEF'ENDANT 
FACTS 
The defendant's statement of the case contains the 
essential facts upon which a determination may be had. 
Except for the allegations made as to the arbitrarines~ 
of the Commission's assessment, which is now being· 
raised for the first time on appeal, the defendant ac-
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4 
quiesces in such statement of facts for the purpose of 
this brief. 
One further fact which it is felt should be noted at 
this time is the fact that the instant controversy was 
presented to the Commission on a claim for refund 
which set forth the reason for the claim as follows: 
''The amount claimed for refund was assessed 
by the commission against the taxpayer for the 
years 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943, and such assess-
ment for the years enumerated was barred by 
applicable statutes of limitation." (Tr. 22) 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
Plaintiff's Assignments of Error raise two questiom\ 
for determination. The first question presented is, we 
submit, the only question to be decided on this appeal. 
That question stated by plaintiff is as follows: 
"(1) Does the taxpayer's procedure in filing 
the Tax Commission's Form 71 constitute the 
filing of a use tax return~'' 
The second question raised by tax,payer 's Assigil-
ment of Error, No. 4, i.e., that the rrax Commissiou 
erred in failing to find that the assessment was arhitrar~' 
and capricious and without basis in law and fad, or, 
as stated in plaintiff's brief as point No. 2, "b the 
method used by the commission in making this assesH-
ment so unconscionable as to be a nullity f '' will not he 
discussed by the defendant, except to point out to the 
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5 
court that this question is being presented for the first 




Does the taxpayer's procedure in filing Tax Commis-
sion Form No. 71 constitute the filing of a use tax return? 
Plaintiff's argument with regard to the question of 
the statute of limitations sets forth no authority in sup-
port of the argurnent that the claim asserted by the Tax 
Commission is barred by the statute of limitations. A 
perusal of plaintiff's argument indicates that nothing 
more is done than to point out to the court the apparent 
unfairness of the assessment, and makes an attempt to 
distinguish the case of Whitmore Oxygen Company vs. 
State Tax Commission, 196 Pac. 2d 976. 
\Ve have no argument with plaintiff's dissertation 
with regard to the purpose of a statute of lin1itations. 
Such a statute is a statute of repose and is for the pur-
pose of compelling the exercise of the right of action 
\Yithin a reasonable tin1e, but it appears that to argu~ 
the purpose of the statute of limitations in this case 
merely begs the question properly presrnted as to when, 
under the circumstances of this case, the statute of limi-
tations began to run. 
\Y e will submit that the taxpayer in this case failed 
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6 
to furnish any information with respect to required ;, 
items as set forth in the instructions furnished the tax-
payer and, therefore, a return has not been filed within 
the meaning and intent of our Use Tax Act. 
Item No. 7, relating to purchases of tangible ~er­
sonal property purchased by the taxpayer for storage, 
use or consumption in this state, on all of the returns 
available, both duplicate and original during the period 
of the audit, is totally blank. (Tr. G4-105, Tr. 118-141) 
True, in several instances, as pointed out by the plain-
tiff in its brief, there are spaces which contain certain 
markings and also in some instances the word ''none.'' 
We would submit that an examination of all the returns 
available during the period of the audit iiHlicates that 
the taxpayer made no genuine endeavor to satisfy the 
requirements of the Tax Commission's instructions. In-
structions issued with regard to Item No. 7 read a:-; 
follows: 
"Item 7. Enter as this item, valued at the 
sales 'Price, all purchases made by you onts:clP ot' 
Utah or in interstate commerce for storage, u~(· 
or consumption by you in this State upon which 
the seller has not collected the use tax. For the 
most part, this item will include equipment, sup-
plies, merchandise, etc., purchased from out-of-
state sellers. It should not include (a) merchan-
dise purchased for resale; or (b) materials which 
become an ingredient or component part of tan-
gible personal property to be sold.'' 
Nor is there any attempt made to comply with the 
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instructions set forth on Form TC 71 under Item 7 
which reads as follows: 
"Purchases-Total purchase price of tangible 
personal property purchased for storage, use, or 
other consumption in this state on which the 
seller has not collected sales or use tax (See 'In-
structions'). '' 
In Flors]zeim Bros. Dry Goods Compauy Y. United 
States (1930) 280 U. S. 453, 460, ~lr. Justice Brandeis 
speaking for a unanimous court stated: 
''The burden of supplying by the return the 
information on which assessments were to be 
based was thus imposed on the taxpayers. And, 
in providing that the period of limitation should 
begin on the date the return was filed, rather 
than when it was due, the statute plainly mani-
fested a purpose that the period was to commence 
only when the taxpayer had supplied this infor-
mation in the prescribed manner.'' 
\Ve submit that, in view of the fact that Item 7 is 
blank on all return~ available, taxpayer did not supply 
information in the prescribed manner. 
In Corona Coal & Coke Company vs. Commissioner 
( 1928) 11 B. T .A. 240, taxpayer filed a form 1120, which 
was duly signed by the proper officers of the company. 
This form ·was blank "'ith the exception of one line 
which required information as to the "net income for 
taxable year.'' At the blank space provided for the 
amount of net income there appeared the word ''none." 
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No other blank spaces were filled in and no other infor-
mation was contained in the return except the name and 
address of the taxpayer. The Board of Tax Appeals in 
that case held in substance that the word "none" writ-
ten on the document was not sufficient to start the run-
ning of the statute of limitations where other informa-
tion is required. See also The Jockey Club (1934) 30 
B;T.A. 670, aff'd. without discussion of this point. 
( C.C.A. 2d 1935). 76 F. 2d 597 (blank return accom-
panied by letter claiming exempt status). 
We submit that the burden of furnishing the infor-
mation upon which an assessment may be made is cast 
by law upon the taxpayer. By measuring the period of 
limitation from the filing of the return, the statute maH.l-
fests a clear legislative intent that: 
'' * * * the ~period should begin only when the 
taxpayer had furnished such information in the 
manner prescribed. Florsheim Bros. Co. Y. United 
States, 380 U. S. 453 * * *. ~ieticulous accuracy, 
perfect completeness, or absence of any omission 
is not exacted. But a return which fails to comply 
in a substantial degree with the requirements of 
the statute in respect to disclosing the requisite 
information essential to the making of assess-
ments does not suffice to start the period of limi-
tation." Alkire Inv. Co. v. Nicholas (C.C.A., lOth 
Cir.), 114 Fed. (2d) 607, 710. 
In denying· the taxpayer's clai1n that collection ot 
the tax was barred by the statute of limitations, the Cir-
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cuit Court in the last cited case stated In addition to 
above quoted matter as follo,vs: 
"• * * While there was no intentional fraud, 
willful negligence or purposed attempt at evasion 
of tax on the part of the taxpayer, the returns 
not only failed to disclose requisite information 
but were misleading and calculated to prevent 
discovery of material facts. Returns of that kind 
are not effective to start the period of limitation 
running. Compare Florsheim Bros. Co. v. United 
States, supra; Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 
U. S. 245 '" * *; Germantown Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner; 309 U. S. 304 * * *; United States v. 
National Tank & Export Co., 5 Cir. 45 F. 2d 1005, 
certiorari denied 283 U. S. 839, ,,, * * Myles Salt 
Co. v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 49 F. 2d 232; Na-
tional Contracting Co. v. Commissioner, 8 Cir., 
105 F. 2d 488." 
So, too, in the instant case, there is no question of 
fraud or willful negligence or any purpose to evade the 
tax, but we submit that the returns are not of the kind 
effective to start the period of the statute of limitations. 
The contention i~ made by the plaintiff, as was done 
in the Whitmore ( >x~'gPil Case, that the fact that Form 
TC 71 was filed regularly and has been sworn to by tlh~ 
taxpayer as a true and contplete rd urn for sales and 
use tax should ha yt-' :-\OlllP effect. This ('OUrt in the vVhi t-
more Ox~·gpn ( 1ompany <'ast> held with regard to thi.-; 
point that, •' If no marks, words or figun·s \\'PrP placed 
on the form at all, that the taxpayer merely signed tlw 
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printed certification, the form so filed would not con-
stitute a return for either sales tax or use tax.'' 
As heretofore stated, the plaintiff attempts to dis-
tinguish the Whitmore Oxygen Case, supra. The differ-
ences noted, we submit, do not go to the fundamental 
question involved herein; i.e., whether the forms as fileu 
with the Tax Commission, conceding that the duplicates 
represent the actual form of the original, constitute a 
use tax return sufficient to start the statute of limita-
tions running. The audit report reveals that the addi-
tional use tax liability results from the failure of tax-
payer to report and remit use tax on purchases subject 
to use tax (Tr. 26), and that portion of the rrturn;; 
herein available relating to purchases made by tlH· tax-
payer is blank in every instance. 
The case of Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Hehering 
( 1934) 293 U. S. 173, establishes the rule that perf('Ct 
accuracy or completeness is not necessan· to resC'ne a 
return from nullity. It is to be noted, hm,·p,·pr, that in 
that case and similar cases, "·bile the return iileu may 
not have been accurate or complete, it did contain en-
tries of the kind required to be included in the return~ 
by federal law. Plaintiff herein filed returns upon which 
the entries, in most cases, were addressed to but one of 
the two tax liabilities and in no instance did it comply 
with the requirement of the Commission's instruction~ 
on Form TC 71 that required 'Plaintiff to set forth its 
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none had been so made. Speculation as to how or why 
the returns were filed as they were would be useless, but 
it is subnlitted that an examination of the returns which 
plaintiff claims started the statute of limitations to 
running will reveal that they are not complete, and 
surely do not furnish the required information. 
The defendant relies on the Whitmore Oxygen Case, 
supra, as being directly in point and submits that the 
finding of the Comlltission, that no use tax return was 
filed during the period of the audit, is correct and should 
be sustained and that no error was committed by the Tax 
Commission in failing to find that the deficiency use tax 
assessment "Ta~ harre<l by any statute of limitation. 
It is felt that some discussion should be had with 
regard to the tax liability asserted by the Commission 
with regard to the year 1940. It is admitted that the 
originals and duplicates of the returns for the year 1940 
have been destroyed in due course of businP~~ h~· the 
taxpayer and thP Com1nission and cannot now be pro-
duced. Plaintiff's eounsel objected to the introductio11 
of certain original and dupli<'ate returns of the taxpayer 
for the ~·ears 1944 to 1949, inclusiYP, and <'ih·~ in sup-
port of its contention that presumptions are lH'Y<'r retro-
adi\·<·. the general rulP cited in Vol. 20, ~\Itwriean Juri:-:.. 
208. Such, we admit, is the general rule. JT(l\n•ver, this 
court in the ease of Uihso11 ,·:-;. EqlfitalJ!e Life Assurnnr:e 
Sociel,tJ (1934), S-! Utah 432, 36 Pae. 2d 103 at p. 111, 
had the following to say concerning this 'principlt>: 
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"While it may be conceded that there is 'no 
'presumption from the fact that a condition exists 
at a particular time that it existed in the past,' it 
is also true that 'proof of present condition of a 
thing may sometimes be admissible and material 
as circumstantial evidence, persuasive as to prior 
condition or status.' Jones Comm. on Evid., Vol. 
1, pp. 440, 441; Encyl. of Evid., pp. 916, 917; 32 
L.R.A. (N.S.) at page 1117, note." 
See also 31 C.J.S., Sec. 140 at page 789, where the 
following appears: 
''As a general rule mere proof of the exist-
ence of a present condition or state of facts or 
proof of the existence of a condition or state of 
facts at a given time, does not raise any pre-
sumption that the same condition or facts existed 
at a prior date, since inferences or presumptions 
of fact ordinarily do not run backward. 
''However, the general rule is not of universal 
application. Whether the past existence of a con-
dition or state of facts may be inferred or pre-
sumed from proof of the existence of a present 
condition or state of facts, or proof of the t•xi~t­
ence of a condition or state of facts at a given 
time, depends largely on the facts and circum-
stances of the individual case, and on the likeli-
hood of intervening circumstances as the true 
origin of the present existence or the existence 
at a given time. Accordingly, in some circum-
stances, an inference as to the past existence of 
a condition or state of facts may be proper, as, 
for example, where the present condition or 
state of facts is one that would not ordinarily 
exist unless it had also existed at the time as 
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to which the presumption is invoked. An infer-
ence that a state of affairs existed at a certain 
time may be reinforced by evidence that it con~ 
tinued to exist at a subsequent time.'' 
'N e submit, therefore, that ·in view of this excep-
tion to the general rule, that the Commission could and 
this court can now consider the course of action taken 
by the tax;payer in this case in filing Tax Commission 
Form 71 with the Tax Commission over this period of 
ye:trs, including the years after the audit. 
It will be noted that not until after the period of 
the audit did the taxpayer make any conscientious, genu-
ine endeavor to compute and pay any use tax to the 
state of Utah. All during the years of the period of the 
audit for which we have either duplicates or originals of 
Form TC 71, the taxpayer exercised no conscious en-
deavor to compute or pay use tax on purchases of tan-
gible personal 1property made for use in Utah. In one 
instance, the :March-April return of 1942, the taxpayer 
computed an amount of $7.44 which purported to be use 
tax on a purchase made in California. (Tr. 92) This is 
the only case during the period of the audit for which 
returns are available in wh:ch the plaintiff computed or 
paid any use tax on a regular return. The only other 
instance where plaintiff paid any use tax \Vas on a single 
return filed on the 8th day of January, 1944, paying the 
use tax on an International-6 truck. This return was 
made out locally and not h~· the plaintiff's general office~ 
at St. Louis, :Missouri, as were all of the other returns. 
(Tr. 140) 
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Surely it is a fair presumption that the 'Plaintiff 
never had any intention to pay any use tax to the state 
of Utah, at least during the period of the audit. The 
schedules set forth in the audit report (Tr. 28-51) in-
dicate the number of items purchased and credited to 
the Utah account. The Commission, after discussions 
with the taxpayer's representative, concluded that under 
the facts of this case there was no negligence and the 
negligence penalty was never assessed against the tax-
payer. It is submitted that the only conclusion that can 
be reached from the facts as presented to this court i::; 
that the taxpayer had no knowledge of the requirement 
of the Tax Commission with regard to the filing of use 
tax returns and, consequently, the conclu~ion is ine~eap­
able that no use tax returns were filed during the period 
of the audit. 
While, as heretofore pointed out, there are no re-
turns, either duplicates or originals, available for tlw 
year 1940, it will be noted that it was not until the Sep-
tember-October return of 1941 that the dupl:cates ind:-
cate any mark of any kind with regard to tltt-' use tax 
and it is submitted that inasmuch as four returns wPre 
filed during the first eight months of the year 1941 ('fr. 
99-106) without a mark of any kind with regard to u~c~ 
tax, the fact may be considered by the court as material 
with regard to the filing of returns during the year 1940, 
and we submit that it is fair to assume that the returns 
filed during 1940 were filed in the Saine manner as were 
the returns immediately subsequent to that year. 
.1~ 
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Point 2. 
Is the method used by the commission in making this 
assessment so unconscionable as to be a nullity? 
~-\s heretofore indicated it is the position of the 
defendant herein that the plaintiff is presenting this 
question for the first time on appeal and consequently 
it is fundamental that such argument will not be con-
sidered by the court. 
Under date of December 17, 1947 the plaintiff herein 
submitted a letter to the Tax Commission (Tr. 3-1-) and 
attached thereto a petition for review of audit division's 
findings and for hearing. (Tr. 55) In this petition tl1P 
plaintiff set forth as grounds for a review and hearing 
the following : 
"1. The findings indicate a tax liability 
which is excessive. 
'' 2. The findings would 1purport to authorize 
a tax for transactions arising prior to December 
11, 1944, and would thus purport to authorize an 
assessment or leYy barred by the Statute of Limi-
tations, State of Utah (Laws 1937, Chapter 138, 
Section 1) '':hich provides that every action for 
a liability created by the Statutes of the State of 
Utah shall be commenced within three years. The 
liability by reason of the findings herein men-
tioned could not, under the law, therefore, exceed 
the sum of $912.78, being the total tax computed 
for 1944 to 1947, inclusive. 
'' 3. There was no negligence or intentional 
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disregard of authorized rules, and the findings ~~ 
are therefore erroneous in assessing a penalty of ;II 
10% and interest at 12% per annum. 
'' 4. The findings are in other respects, erron-
eous.'' ;m 
Unfortunately all of the corespondence had in this 
matter does not appear in the record. Under date of 
April 26, 1948 the plaintiff communicated with th~ 
Commission and stated as follmYs: 
"The Statute of Limitations being the main 
exception we are taking to your audit deficiency 
report, and it is my desire if possible to .avoid a 
trip to Utah for the hearing and the time-con-
suming operation of checking back through old 
records to ascertain whether or not the items 
contained in your audit report were taxable, we 
will be willing to settle this deficiency without a 
hearing, if you will waive the penalty of 10% 
and interest at 12% per annum which is claimed 
by you for negligence or intentional disregard for 
authorized rules. 
"I will welcome your comments should your 
Commission be willing to settle on the above 
basis with the understanding that w·e could ex-
pect a refund if the decision in the case of \Yhit-
more Oxygen Company is in favor of the tax-
payer.'' 
Upon receipt of this letter the Commission consid-
ered the matter and the taxpayer was advised that tlw 
penalty and a portion of the interest had been cancellerl. 
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was no negligence and thus the penalty originally asses-
sed could be deleted. (Tr. 9) 
The plaintiff was further advised that the total 
amount then due was $5,249.97. (Tr. 52) This amount 
was paid to the Commission with the understanding that 
the matter would be heard on a claim for refund and was 
held up pending the outcome of the Whitmore Oxygen 
Company case, in which a similar question was being 
determined by the Supreme Court (Tr. 9). 
It should be noted that the settlement thus made 
was made with the understanding that the taxpayer 
could expect a refund if the decision in the 'Yhitmore 
Oxygen Company case ·was in favor of the taxpayer, and 
there was no other proviso. 
The attention of the court is also called to the pre-
liminary statements and the stipulations of counsel. 
(Tr. 8-12) It is submitted that nowhere in these stah··-
ments or stipulations as to the basis of the hearing did 
the taxpayer, 1)~' and through its counsel, assert that tlw 
Tax Commission was being arbitrary or unconscionable. 
It being a fundamental principle of law that matters 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, it is suh-
mitted that the asserted arbitrary action hy the Commis-
sion should not be considered h~, the court. Even assum-
ing that the court can consider the question of arbitrari-
ness on the part of the Commiss~on, and eonsider point 
two, it is submitted that the record does not sustain 
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plaintiff's position that the Commission acted arbitrarily. 
The payment in this case, as heretofore pointed out, was 
made because the taxpayer had no desire to ''check back 
through old records,'' ( Tr. 53) and thus comply with 
the reasonable request of the examining officer set forth 
in the summary of the audit report (Tr. 26) as follows: 
''The examining officer would appreciate it 
if the invoices and contracts of his listed in the 
report would be forwarded to taxpayer's Salt 
L:ake Office, where he could examine them.'' 
Can the plaintiff now seriously contend, havin~ 
agreed to the settlement of the tax provided the tax would 
be refunded in the event of a favorable decision in the 
Whitmore Oxygen Company case, that the Commission's 
assessment was so arbitrary as to be a nullity~ wr e 
think not. 
It is respectfully submitted, in view of the fact that 
the question as to the unconscionableness of the asse~,.;­
ment is being raised for the first time on appeal, and 
particularly in view of the fact that there is no substan-
tial evidence in the record that the Commission did ad 
arbitrarily, that the court should not consider point No.2. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion the defendant, State Tax Commission! 
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in presented and the authorities cited, this rourt should 
deny petitioner's l'laim~. 
WHEREFORE, defendanb pray that the <lPeii"iion 
heretofore rendered by the Tax Commission in this 
matter be affirmed and judgment rendered accordingly. 
Respectfull~r submitted, 
G. Hal Taylor, 
Attorney for Defendant~ 
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